Why the bid protest system should be eliminated (or curtailed or reined in)

Why the bid protest system should be eliminated (or curtailed or reined in)

Many public policy officials and business people object to the protest process in US government contracting.

Among other things, they assert that:

in the commercial world – it’s unusual and counter-productive for vendors to sue their (prospective) clients – or, in other words – you don’t bite the hand that feeds you;
protests delay the award of contracts and disrupt the government’s ability to engage in the business of governance (e.g., serving the public, defending the nation, solving problems, etc.);
there are too many incentives for losers (or whiners) or disappointed offerors to protest – particularly when it comes to incumbent contractors on routine service contracts (such as food service or custodial contracts) – the protest process all but guarantees the incumbent two or three extra months of work on a contract they lost fair and square;
protests are expensive – they waste the government’s scarce resources – and the only winners are the attorneys;
protests make government acquisition professionals overly risk averse or conservative and, as a result, the government doesn’t get the best bang for its buck; or
it’s ridiculous to have three protest options (or flavors of protests) – agency protests, GAO protests, and federal court (COFC) protests – that’s overkill; etc.
Do you agree or disagree?

Explain why (either):

(1) the bid protest system should be eliminated (or curtailed or reined in) or

(2) it is an important aspect of the government contracting regime and should be left alone (or as is).